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Developing Epistemological Understanding in Scientific and Social Domains through 
Argumentation  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The present work examines whether engagement in an argument-based 
intervention can support the development of evaluativist epistemological 
understanding. Students were randomly assigned to one of two intervention conditions 
- focusing on either a social or science topic - and their epistemological 
understanding was assessed before and after the intervention using both a social and a 
science topic. Students' views about their own and scientists' processes of 
knowing were also assessed. Results showed that engagement in dialogic argumentive 
activities supported the development of more evaluativist domain-specific 
epistemological understanding. Further qualitative analysis showed domain differences 
in how participants valued evidence in the process of knowing, supporting the view 
that there are different challenges in the development of epistemological understanding 
across domains. Overall, the present study’s findings have important educational 
implications and suggest that engagement in argumentive activities is a promising 
pathway for supporting the development of epistemological understanding. 
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Epistemological beliefs are individuals’ beliefs about knowledge and knowing (Hofer & 
Pintrich, 1997). Within the epistemological beliefs literature, there are two main theoretical 
frameworks: the multidimensional approach and the developmental approach. The 
multidimensional approach conceptualizes epistemological beliefs as a system of more or less 
independent beliefs (Hofer, 2004; Schommer, 1994), whereas the developmental approach 
proposes that there is a developmental progression of epistemological understanding (Kitchener 
& King, 1994; Kuhn, 1991; Perry, 1970). Despite this difference, the actual dimensions of beliefs 
proposed by each approach are relatively consistent (Hofer, 2004); further, the two approaches 
similarly conceptualize beliefs on a continuum from less constructivist to more constructivist 
(e.g., that knowledge is personally constructed). Moreover, although several multidimensional 
frameworks have been proposed, these too share commonalities that can be categorized along 
four dimensions (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Two of these dimensions, (1) the certainty of 
knowledge, which ranges from absolute to tentative knowledge, and (2) simplicity of knowledge, 
which ranges from viewing knowledge as the sum of simple facts to viewing knowledge as a 
complex net of interrelated concepts, refer to the nature of knowledge. The other two dimensions, 
(3) source for knowing, which ranges from the belief that knowledge is transmitted from external 
authority to the belief that knowledge is constructed by individuals, and (4) justification for 
knowing, which ranges from the belief that direct observation of the world and authority are the 
sources of knowing to the belief that knowledge is acquired through the application of the rules 
of inquiry and evaluation, refer to the nature of knowing.  
  The present study focuses on the development of epistemological understanding and, 
thus, the developmental approach to epistemological understanding has been used. According to 
this approach, the developmental task that underlies the progression toward mature 
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epistemological understanding is the coordination of the subjective and objective components of 
knowing (Greene et al., 2008; Hofer, 2004; Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000). In this context, 
epistemological understanding progresses from the absolutist level to the multiplist level and, 
finally, to the evaluativist level (Kuhn et al., 2000). In the absolutist level, the objective 
dimension of knowing dominates. Knowledge is conceived as an objective, external entity, which 
is knowable with certainty. In the mutliplist level, there is a radical transition from an objective 
view of knowledge to the subjective view of knowledge. Knowledge is no longer considered an 
object that is located in the external world, but a product of the human mind which is located in 
one’s self. At the multiplist level, the uncertain and subjective nature of knowledge comes to the 
foreground and dominates one’s view of knowledge. The realization that knowledge is 
constructed by human minds drives multiplists to the conclusion that knowledge is entirely 
subjective. To the multiplist, evaluating beliefs is both pointless and impossible, since there are 
no objective standards that could serve as the basis for evaluation of conflicting claims. At the 
evaluativist level, a balance is achieved between the objective and subjective components of 
knowledge (Kuhn et al., 2000). Knowledge at this level is neither conceived as an objective entity 
available in the external world waiting to be discovered, nor as a totally relativistic, subjective 
opinion. Mature epistemological understanding instead involves the coordination of the 
subjective and objective components of knowledge. If knowledge evolves through coordination 
of theory with data, then evaluation plays a central role in mature epistemological understanding. 
Through evaluation, the position found to be best supported by argument and evidence would be 
determined to have more merit compared to alternative positions (Kuhn et al., 2000).  
 The development of epistemological understanding is both domain general and domain 
specific. The developmental pattern of progression of epistemological understanding, ranging 
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from absolutist to evaluativist epistemological understanding, is common across domains (Kuhn 
et al., 2000); however, several studies have documented that an individual’s epistemological 
understanding can differ across domains and topics (Kuhn et al., 2000; Kuhn, Iordanou, Pease & 
Wirkala, 2008). The work of Kuhn, Iordanou et al. (2008) suggests that there are qualitatively 
different challenges in the development of epistemological understanding across domains. 
Specifically, the major challenge in the social domain is to overcome the view that human 
interpretation plays an unmanageable, overpowering role, whereas the major challenge in the 
science domain is to recognize that human interpretation plays any role at all.    
Epistemological beliefs are fundamental for learning and thinking. Researchers, in an 
effort to gain an understanding of how individuals’ beliefs about knowledge and knowing relate 
to their learning and reasoning, examined the influence of epistemological understanding on 
problem solving in the context of mathematics problem solving (Muis, 2008), educational 
psychology (Muis & Franco, 2010), conceptual change in the context of physics (Mason et al., 
2008; Nussbaum, Sinatra, & Poliquin, 2008), text comprehension (Schommer et al., 1992; 
Stømsø, Bråten, & Britt, 2011), internet-based learning (Mason, Ariasi, & Boldrin, 2011; Mason, 
Boldrin, & Ariasi, 2010; Strømsø & Bråten 2010) and reasoning (Mason & Scirica, 2006). This 
line of research showed an association between constructivist beliefs about knowledge and 
knowing and the development of advanced thinking skills and learning (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; 
Mason, Ariasi & Boldrin, 2011). For example, Mason et al. (2010) found that students who 
viewed comparison of multiple sources and scientific evidence as an appealing means to justify 
knowledge had higher gains from online learning. In an effort to understand how epistemological 
beliefs support thinking and learning, Iordanou et al. (submitted) used a think-aloud methodology 
to examine relations between individuals’ epistemological understanding and online processing 
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of evidence while reading text. Their findings showed that participants who exhibited evaluativist 
epistemological understanding engaged in more meta-level processing of evidence; that is, they 
reflected more on the evidence’s credibility and its function in the context of argument, compared 
to participants who held non-evaluativist epistemological understanding. Given the importance of 
epistemological understanding to learning and thinking, research findings showing that most 
children and even adults hold non-constructivist views of knowledge (Kuhn et al., 2000; Leach, 
Driver, Millar, & Scott, 1997) are a source of concern. Thus, the question of how to support the 
development of epistemological understanding is a central one.  
In the present study I propose that engagement in dialogic argumentation can be a 
promising condition for supporting the development of epistemological understanding. The 
context of dialogic argumentation involves exposure to alternative positions, a need to justify 
one’s own position with evidence to an opponent, and a need to challenge the opponent’s position 
— conditions which may facilitate the development of an evaluativist epistemological 
understanding. Exposure to alternative positions supported by evidence could prompt individuals 
to abandon absolutist epistemological views of a single objective reality. Also, receiving and 
providing criticism could help individuals to develop an appreciation of the role of argument and 
evidence in knowledge construction. Some studies that examined the epistemic dimensions of 
argumentation (that is, students’ epistemological understanding of what constitutes an acceptable 
claim to knowledge during argumentation), found that when students engaged in extensive 
practice in dialogic argumentation, their understanding and application of epistemic criteria, such 
as the explicit justification of claims with appropriate evidence, improves (Iordanou & 
Constantinou, 2014; 2015; Kuhn, Zillmer, Crowell, & Zavala, 2013). When 11th graders engaged 
in collaborative dialogic argumentation within the SOCRATES web-based learning environment, 
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Iordanou and Constantinou (2015) observed an increase in students’ use of scientific data to 
support their arguments, an increase in citations of their data sources, and a decrease in 
employment of personal opinions. These findings suggest that students developed, at least 
implicitly, an epistemological understanding of the constructive nature of scientific knowledge. 
Students exhibited a shift from presenting their “right,” unsupported self-evident theories of how 
things are, to employing data to support their positions and offering alternative interpretations for 
particular pieces of evidence. Observing students engaged in prolonged dialogic argumentation, 
Kuhn et al. (2013) reported gains in epistemological understanding of argument norms — 
specifically in terms of what constitutes acceptable claims to knowledge and acceptable ways to 
advance them in discourse. Although the studies described above (Iordanou & Constantinou, 
2015; Kuhn et al., 2013) reported improvements in students’ understanding of the epistemic 
norms of argumentation, no direct measures for assessing students’ epistemological 
understanding were employed.    
Present study   
 The present work examines whether engagement in an argument-based intervention 
supports the development of students’ epistemological understanding. The intervention involved 
argumentive activities, where students worked with a partner in arguing with a succession of 
pairs of classmates who held an opposing view on the topic, reflective activities based on 
transcriptions of the dialogues, and a goal-based component for maintaining students’ interest 
and involvement throughout the intervention. Previous work showed that engagement in this 
intervention supported the development of students’ argumentation skills (Iordanou, 2010; 
Iordanou & Constantinou, 2014; 2015; Kuhn et al., 2013; Kuhn, Goh, Iordanou, & Shaenfield, 
2008). The present work extends these prior studies by examining whether engagement in an 
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argument-based intervention facilitates the development of epistemological understanding.  In 
addition, the present work examines the issue of domain-specificity of epistemological 
understanding. Students were randomly assigned to one of two intervention conditions – focusing 
on either a social topic or a science topic – and their epistemological understanding was assessed 
before and after the intervention in both the social and science domains, using scenario-based, 
domain-specific instruments. In addition, to gain a better understanding of participants’ 
epistemological understanding, individual interviews were conducted to examine participants’ 
epistemological understanding about themselves and scientists within their intervention domain. 
We hypothesized that engagement in an argument-based intervention in a particular domain 
would facilitate the development of an evaluativist epistemological understanding in that 
particular domain, reflected in both the scenario-based instruments and individual interviews 
about their and scientists’ process of knowledge. Given the evidence for domain specificity in 
epistemological understanding, we expected that this improvement in epistemological 
understanding would be domain specific and that students’ epistemological understanding would 
vary across domains (Kuhn, Iordanou et al., 2008; Muis, Bendixen, & Haerle 2006).  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 44 sixth graders from a public elementary school in a middle-class suburban 
area in the country of Cyprus. The sample consisted of the entire sixth grade of a particular 
school. All were 11 or 12 years of age; 27 were boys and 17 were girls. Participants were 
primarily from a middle-class population. Roughly 30% were from minority ethnic groups. Four 
participants, whose language abilities were judged by the school system as needing remediation, 
participated but were not included in the analysis. 
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Initial and Final Assessment 
Participants’ epistemological understanding was assessed through (a) individual interviews based 
on a physical science scenario and a social science scenario – the Frog problem and the Livia 
problem – conducted before and after the intervention, and, (b) individual interviews about their 
own and scientists’ epistemological understanding, conducted after the intervention. Participants’ 
responses were audio recorded and then transcribed for analysis.  
 The Livia and Frog problems. To assess participants’ epistemological understanding in 
the social and science domains, the Livia problem (Kuhn, Iordanou et al., 2008, see Table 1) and 
Frog problem (Linn, Shear, Bell & Slotta, 1999, see Table 2) were used, respectively. The Livia 
problem presented two contradictory accounts from two historians regarding the fictitious Fifth 
Livia war. The Frog problem presented two contradictory accounts from two scientists about 
deformities observed in frogs. The two accounts for each problem were presented in a 
counterbalanced order. During an individual interview, which lasted about 40 minutes, 
participants received a hard copy of each instrument and were instructed to read the two accounts 
carefully and get ready to answer some questions about the accounts. Participants completed the 
two instruments in a counter-balanced order. Participants in each case were asked first to describe 
in their own words what the 5th Livia war/frog issue was about and whether the two 
historians’/scientists’ accounts were different in any important ways. Then participants were 
asked questions about the rightness of the two accounts (Could both of the historians’ accounts 
be right? Is one of the historian’s accounts more true than the other?) and the certainty of 
knowledge (How could you be certain of what happened in the 5th Livia war?). 
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Interviews about own and scientists’ epistemological understanding. Participants’ views 
about their own and scientists’ process of knowing were examined on a separate individual 
interview, which took place at the final assessment. To examine participants’ views about 
scientists’ process of knowing in the science and social domains, students were asked two 
questions (“How do those studying the topic of dinosaurs know that dinosaurs disappeared 
because of the asteroid/volcanoes?”; and “How do those studying the topic of homeschooling 
know that children could be taught at home/should go to school?”). To examine participants’ 
views about their own process of knowing in the science and social domains, students were asked 
two additional questions (“How do you know that dinosaurs disappeared because of the asteroid/ 
volcanoes?”; and “How do you know that children could be taught at home/should go to 
school?”). Finally, participants were asked to compare the way they know about the issue with 
the way scientists do.  
 
Table 1 
Table 2 
Intervention 
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of two conditions: a) the social condition or b) the 
science condition. The two intervention conditions were identical in terms of the activities 
employed except for the intervention topic: homeschooling was used for the social condition and 
dinosaur extinction for the science condition. The intervention took place during thirteen 40-
minute sessions occurring twice per week in the participants’ classroom. The two intervention 
conditions took place simultaneously, with participants taking part in only one of the two. 
Participants were told that they were preparing for a final ‘‘showdown’’ in which they would 
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debate their topic (either homeschooling or dinosaur extinction) with their classmates who held 
the opposing view (for more details regarding the intervention see Iordanou, 2010). 
 
Assessing Initial Positions. Participants’ initial positions and supporting arguments regarding 
both the social topic − home-school − and the science topic − dinosaur extinction − were assessed 
individually in writing. For the home-school topic, participants were presented with a scenario 
about a Japanese child who moved to Cyprus for one year. Participants were to decide whether 
the child should go to the town school or whether he could be taught at home. For the dinosaur 
extinction topic, students were presented two scientists’ views about dinosaur extinction: one 
scientist maintained that dinosaurs were quickly exterminated by the collision of an asteroid with 
Earth, while the other scientist maintained that dinosaurs disappeared gradually due to giant 
volcanic eruptions. Students had to decide which of the two theories should be included in the 
sixth graders’ science book to explain dinosaur extinction. For each scenario, students could also 
choose the option “undecided.” Based on participants’ responses on the topics, two groups of 10 
participants each were formed in each condition. The participants who indicated they were 
undecided gave reasons for both sides of the issue and were assigned to one or the other position 
in a way that served to equate the number of participants on each side. In the social condition, 
one group of students supported the homeschool option and the other group the town school 
option. In the science condition, one group supported the view that an asteroid collision caused 
the dinosaurs’ extinction, where the other group supported the view that volcanic eruptions were 
the cause.   
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Preparation for supporting reasons with evidence. Participants in each condition initially worked 
in groups with other same side peers. They were given a list of ‘‘some possibly relevant facts’’ 
supporting both positions of the topic in a random order. They were asked to review this 
information individually and then to decide as a team if there were any facts they wished to use. 
An adult coach, who was a researcher, facilitated each group’s work, answering questions and 
helping to keep students focused on the task but offering no direct instruction or feedback. 
 
Engagement in dialogic argumentation. Within each group, participants were organized into 
same-gender pairs. Participants were asked to collaborate with their partners and agree on what to 
say before typing and sending it to their opponent via instant messaging (IM). These pairs 
worked together on the IM dialogues until the ‘‘showdown’’ segment of the intervention. 
Participants were instructed that their goal was to convince the other pair that their position was 
better. They engaged in dialogic argumentation for five sessions, discussing with a different pair 
on each session. Two or three adult coaches (who were the same in both conditions), circulated 
throughout the room during these sessions, answering any questions and reminding pairs to 
collaborate with one another in deciding on a response.  
 
Engagement in reflective activities. After three of the five dialogue sessions were complete, the 
students engaged in the first reflective activity. During these reflective sessions, a printed 
transcript of the preceding session’s dialogue was given to participants along with a scaffold 
sheet. The scaffold sheets prompted students to reflect on the opposing pair’s argument and their 
own counterargument as well as on the opponents’ counterargument and their own rebuttal to 
the counterargument. Participants were asked to think of how they could improve 
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on their counterargument or rebuttal. Adult coaches circulated to provide clarifications when 
necessary. A total of three reflective sessions took place, that alternated with the 3rd, 4th and 5th 
dialogue sessions.  
 
Preparation for showdown and final showdown. Participants were told to prepare for a 
final showdown debate with the opposing side. Participants had one session to prepare and 
the following session to conduct the showdown. During preparation, the participants’ task was to 
prepare effective counterarguments to use when faced with opponents’ arguments and effective 
rebuttals to use when faced with opponents’ counterarguments in the showdown.  Transcripts of 
the dialogues, scaffold sheets, and blank index cards were provided to participants.  
 
Judgment and feedback. The electronic dialogue produced in the showdown was represented in 
an argument map prepared by the researchers. Different columns appeared for each team, with 
their contributions arranged in order of occurrence from top to bottom. All statements were 
represented and connected by lines to show their interrelation. Different colors were used to label 
statements as constituting effective, ineffective, or neutral argumentative moves. A point system 
was also applied, making it possible to declare a winning team. The argument map and associated 
point scoring were presented to participants in a session following the showdown. 
 
Coding 
Participants’ verbal protocols were transcribed and coded by two coders. Two trained research 
assistants, blind to the treatment, time, and identity of the participants coded all students’ 
responses over a semester. Disagreements between coders were resolved through discussion. 
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Inter-rater reliability calculated with Cohen’s kappa was 0.8, indicating good inter-rater 
reliability. 
The Livia and Frog problems. Responses to all three questions ─ regarding whether both 
of the historians’ accounts could be right, whether one scientist can be more right than the other, 
and what would help us become more certain of what happened/what is the cause of the problem 
─ were used to identify each participant’s epistemic profile, based on the coding scheme 
developed by Kuhn, Iordanou et al. (2008). The first two questions received Yes/No responses 
while the third was open-ended.  Participants were classified as absolutists if they responded that 
one view could be more right than the other and that certainty was empirically possible via direct 
observation of data, by asking a scientist, or by overcoming some practical limitations. They 
were classified as multiplists if they reported that one view could not be more right than the other 
and that certainty was not possible because of the subjective nature of human knowing. Finally, 
participants were classified as evaluativists if they reported that one view could be more right 
than the other and that certainty was not possible, but it could be approachable through 
investigation, analysis and interpretation of evidence (see examples in Table 3). If a participant 
exhibited epistemological beliefs that could be classified in two epistemological categories, the 
predominant category was used for categorization.  
Students’ views about their own and scientists’ process of knowing. Participants’ 
responses to the questions regarding their own and scientists’ process of knowing were coded 
based on a coding scheme developed for the purposes of the present study. A portion of 
responses (15%) from the sample was used as a basis for developing the coding scheme which 
included categories that captured the range of responses observed (see Tables 5 and 6). After 
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devising the initial scheme, coders coded another 15% of responses to insure that the coding 
scheme was able to capture all responses.  
Table 3 
Results  
Development of Epistemological Understanding 
To examine our first research question of whether engagement in argumentive and 
reflective activity supports the development of students’ epistemological understanding, a Chi-
square test was conducted comparing the number of students who exhibited mature (that is, 
evaluativist) epistemological understanding at initial and final assessment on the intervention 
topic. Table 4 shows the number of participants who were profiled as absolutists, multiplists and 
evaluativists by condition, time, and topic. Overall, the number of participants who exhibited 
evaluativist epistemological understanding increased from initial to final assessment on the 
intervention topic, X2 (1) = 9.683, p = .002. While only 10% (4 out of 39) of participants 
exhibited evaluativist epistemological understanding on the intervention topic, by the end of the 
intervention 41% (16 out of 39) did so (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Number of Students showing an Absolutist and Multiplist position at Initial and Final 
Assessment by Topic, Time and Condition. 
Condition        Topic             Initial Assessment                                      Final Assessment 
                 Absolutists  Multiplists  Evaluativists       Absolutists  Multiplists  Evaluativists 
Social      Intervention          17                   2                0                    12              1                6* 
(N=19)        (Social)         
  Non-intervention     11                  3                 5                    12              0                7 
       (Science)         
                       
Science    Intervention          13                 3                  4                   10                    0             10* 
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(N=20)        (Science) 
             Non-intervention      16                 2                  2                 17                    0                3 
       (Social)  
                                  
    To examine our second research question (i.e., whether development of 
epistemological understanding is domain specific), we ran a Chi-square test comparing 
improvement in epistemological understanding on the social and science topics by Condition. We 
coded as improvement any transition to a more mature category from initial to final assessment 
(that is, from absolutist to multiplist or evaluativist and from multiplist to evaluativist). Results 
showed that there were significant differences between participants in the social and science 
conditions in terms of the improvement they exhibited on the social topic, X2 (1) = 4.378, p = 
.036. Of participants in the social condition, six exhibited improvement in epistemological 
understanding while 13 did not. Of those in the science condition, only one of 20 participants 
improved. We observed no significant difference in improvement in epistemological 
understanding on the science topic between participants in the science condition and participants 
in the social condition, X2 (1) = 2.266, p = .132. In particular, six of the science condition 
participants showed improvement, while 14 did not, and two of the social condition participants 
showed improvement, while 17 did not.  
To gain a better understanding of the domain-specificity vs. domain-generality of the 
development of epistemological understanding, and given the small number of participants 
showing improvement, we also conducted a Related-Samples McNemar test comparing the 
number of participants who exhibited evaluativist epistemological understanding on initial and 
final assessments for each condition, including both intervention and non-intervention topics. 
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Social Topic. At initial assessment on the social topic, none of the social condition 
participants and only two of the science condition participants exhibited an evaluativist 
epistemological understanding (see Table 4). At final assessment, there was a significant increase 
in the number of participants in the social condition who held an evaluativist epistemological 
understanding (p = .031, Related-Samples, McNemar test). Six of 19 social condition participants 
(31.5%) exhibited an evaluativist position at the final assessment, whereas none of them did so at 
initial assessment. No significant increase was observed, however, in the science condition 
participants. 
Science Topic. On the science topic, five of 19 (or 26.3% of) social condition participants 
exhibited evaluativist beliefs at initial assessment, and about the same number of students, 7 out 
of 19 (or 36.8%), did so at the final assessment. Whereas no significant change was observed in 
social condition participants on the science topic, a significant change was observed in science 
condition participants from initial to final assessment on the science topic. In particular, while 
only four of 20 (20%) of science condition participants exhibited evaluativist understanding at 
initial assessment, half of these participants – 10 of 20 – did so at final assessment (p = .031, 
Related-Samples McNemar test).  
  Overall, McNemar within-subjects analysis comparing participant responses at initial and 
final assessment on the intervention and non-intervention topics showed that the number of 
participants exhibiting evaluativist epistemological understanding increased from initial to final 
assessment on the intervention topic, but not on the transfer topic.  
 
Students’ views about Scientists’ process of knowing.  
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To gain further understanding regarding differences in students’ epistemological understanding 
across domains, we examined students’ responses in individual interviews about their own and 
scientists’ process of knowing. 
Social Domain. When participants in the social condition were asked how those studying 
the topic of homeschooling know that children could be taught at home/should go to school, 53% 
− or nine of 17 (as seen in Table 5) – provided claims unsupported by evidence. For example, 
one student said, “Because teachers are better.” Another 24% − four of 17 – claimed that 
scientists know because they pursue research, without giving any further details. Twelve percent 
− two of 17 – claimed that they know because they have first-hand observation (e.g. “because 
they saw it”). Six percent − one of 17 – claimed that scientists thought it, and another 6% − one 
of 17 – claimed that scientists know it because they have studied for many years.  
Science Domain. When children in the science condition were asked how those studying 
the topic of dinosaurs know that dinosaurs disappeared because of the asteroid/volcanoes, 67% − 
12 of 18 (as seen on Table 5) – claimed that scientists know because they found evidence. 
Students in this category provided pieces of evidence in their responses (e.g. mineral glass, crater 
in Mexico, dinosaurs’ fossils and lava, or asteroid rock). Twenty-two percent − four of 18 – 
provided undocumented evidence claims from personal knowledge. Some examples of students’ 
responses in this category include: “there were many explosions in the past,” “asteroids fall 
everywhere, there are no volcanoes everywhere,” “there were many volcanoes,” and “asteroids 
do not fall everyday.” Eleven percent − two of 18 – claimed that scientists know because they 
pursue research, without giving any further details.   
 Social vs. Science Domain. A chi-square test comparing social- and science-condition 
participants’ responses revealed a significant difference regarding their views of scientists’ 
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source of knowledge. As seen on Table 5, more science-condition students (N = 12) than social-
condition students (N = 1) identified evidence as a source of knowing for scientists (N =1),  X2 
(1) = 13.836, p <.001.   
Table 5. Students’ views about scientists’ process of knowing in the social and science domains. 
 Science Domain (N = 18) Social Domain (N = 17) 
Evidence 12* 1 
Research 2 3 
Unsupported Evidence Claims 4 9 
First hand observation 0 2 
Scientists’ education 0 1 
Thinking 0 1 
 
p < .001 
Students’ views about their own process of knowing.  
Social Domain. When students in the social condition were asked how they know that 
children could be taught at home/should go to school, 35% − six of 17 – responded by providing 
claims from general knowledge (e.g. “you don’t have friends at home”; “he will feel more 
comfortable to ask a question of his parents than his teachers”); 29% − five of 17 – responded by 
providing some personal experience (e.g., “I attend school, too, and I have friends”; “you can 
socialize and make friends at school; now that I’m at school I know this”); 18%  − three of 17 – 
reported that they thought this, 6% − one of 17 – claimed that they heard this from scientists; and 
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12% − two of 17 – reported that they know this because of research, without giving further 
details.  
Science Domain. When students in the science condition were asked how they know that 
dinosaurs disappeared because of the asteroid/volcanoes, 67% − 12 of 17 – claimed that they 
knew because they had evidence, 17% − three of 17 – reported that they knew because they had 
read books or watched documentaries, 6% − one of 17 – claimed that they have learned from 
scientists, and 11% − two of 17 – reported undocumented evidence claims (e.g., an asteroid 
caused a tsunami).  
 Social vs. Science Domain. Science- and social-condition students differed in their views 
about their source of knowledge. In particular, more science-condition students (N = 12) than 
social-condition students (N = 0) reported that evidence is the source of their knowledge, (p < 
.001, Fisher’s Exact Text). 
Table 6. Students’ views about their own process of knowing in the social and science domains. 
 Science Domain ( N= 18) Social Domain (N = 17) 
Evidence 12* 0 
Research 0 2 
Books, encyclopedia, 
documentaries 
3 0 
Scientists 1 1 
Unsupported evidence claims  2 6 
Thinking 0 3 
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Personal Experience 0 5 
 
*p < .001 
 
How students compare scientists’ and their own process of knowing. 
Social Domain. Nine of 17 (or 53% of) students in the social condition claimed that the 
way they know about the topic and the way scientists do is the same. Twenty-nine percent − five 
of 17 – claimed that they and scientists share the same reasons (e.g., that there are better 
opportunities for acquiring knowledge and making friends at school). Twelve percent − two of 17 
– claimed that both they and scientists know about the issue through thinking about it, while 
another 12% responded that the way they know about the issue and the way scientists do is the 
same, but without providing any explanation. Forty-seven percent − eight of 17 – claimed that the 
way they have learned about the issue is different from the way scientists did. In particular, 24% 
− four of 17 – reported that they know from personal experience while scientists know because 
they pursue research, 18% − three of 17 – claimed that scientists know better than they do, and 
9% − one of 17− claimed that the way they have learned differ with the way scientists have 
learned, but they didn’t provide any further explanation.  
Science Domain. All the students in the science condition reported that scientists pursue 
research and find evidence, while they (the students) study the evidence that scientists produce. 
Some examples from students’ responses include: “I learn from them, they pursue research”; “we 
have evidence, they pursue research”; “I learned it from books and films, scientists discovered 
it”; “I support this because there are more evidence, scientists find evidence.” 
Social vs. Science Domain. Science- and social-condition participants differed in how 
they compared scientists’ and their own processes of knowing. While only eight of the 17 social-
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condition students claimed that there was a difference between how they had acquired knowledge 
about their intervention topic and how scientists did, all science-condition students claimed that 
the way they had learned about their intervention topic was different from the way scientists did, 
p < .001, Fisher’s Exact Test.   
Discussion 
Results showed that engagement in dialogic argument activities supported the 
development of more constructivist domain-specific epistemological understanding. In particular, 
participants in the science condition showed a significant advance in epistemological 
understanding in the science domain only, whereas participants in the social condition showed a 
significant advance in epistemological understanding in the social domain only. These findings 
show that extensive engagement in an argumentative activity is a promising condition for 
supporting the development of epistemological understanding. Notably, in the present study there 
was no direct instruction of the role of evidence or evaluation for belief formation, therefore the 
improvements observed in participants’ epistemological understanding cannot be attributed to 
learning from direct teaching. Also, the fact that gains in participants’ epistemological 
understanding were observed in a non-intervention topic suggests that these improvements can be 
attributed to the development of an appreciation of the role of evidence and evaluation in 
knowledge acquisition.   
Qualitative analysis of participants’ responses regarding their own and scientists’ 
epistemological understanding revealed differences between participants who engaged in an 
intervention focused on a social topic and those who engaged in one focused on a science topic 
— particularly in terms of how they  valued evidence for the process of knowing. Students 
considered evidence to be the main source of their own and scientists’ knowledge in the physical 
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science domain, while personal experience and subjective thinking were considered to be the 
main source of knowing in the social science domain. This finding of domain differences in 
epistemological understanding is consistent with the view of Kuhn, Iordanou, et al. (2008), who 
suggest that there are different challenges in the development of epistemological understanding 
across domains.  The major challenge in the social domain is to overcome the view that human 
interpretation plays an unmanageable, overpowering role, whereas the major challenge in the 
science domain is to recognize that human interpretation plays any role at all (Kuhn, Iordanou, et 
al., 2008). The domain differences in epistemological understanding that we observed also 
highlight domain differences in evidential standards (Chinn et al., 2011). Students who engaged 
in a science-focused argument intervention exhibited an appreciation of scientific evidence and 
they considered it central for belief formation. On the other hand, students who participated in the 
same intervention but focused on a social topic appeared to consider personal experiences as 
meeting sufficient evidential standards. These findings have important educational implications, 
pointing to the challenge of supporting an understanding that evaluation of different views based 
on criteria is feasible not only in the physical science domain, but also in the social science 
domain.  
In addition to differences across domains, differences were also observed within a 
domain. The students who participated in an argument-focused intervention on a social topic 
showed improvements in their epistemological understanding, measured with a scenario-based 
instrument about a fictitious 5th Livia war; however, when they were asked about their 
epistemological understanding on homeschooling, their intervention topic, they didn’t seem to 
value evidence as a source of knowledge. These differences might suggest that there are topic-
specific differences in epistemological understanding, even within a particular domain (Kuhn, 
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Iordanou et al., 2008). These differences might also suggest that although students had developed 
some evaluativist epistemological understanding, evidenced by the appreciation they developed 
toward research in the scenario-based instrument, this understanding was not yet complete, as 
evidenced by their limited appreciation toward evidence in the individual interviews. Further 
research is required to gain a better understanding of domain-specificity of both epistemological 
understanding and epistemological development. One limitation of the present study is that it 
examined participants’ epistemological understanding only before and after the intervention. It 
would have been informative if participants’ epistemological understanding were also examined 
throughout the intervention. Finally, given the complexity of epistemological understanding, 
future research should examine how engagement in argumentation influences the development of 
different components of epistemic cognition, such as epistemic values and justification of 
knowledge (Chinn et al., 2011; Greene, Muis, & Pieschl, 2010). Nevertheless, the findings of the 
present study suggest that argumentation is a promising pathway for the development of 
epistemological understanding. Through argumentation students develop an understanding that 
knowledge is amenable to critique and evaluation; such an understanding is central to the 
development of evaluativist epistemological understanding that is fundamental to learning and 
reasoning. 
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Table 1. The Livia Problem 
 
North and South Livia are two small countries that existed in the 1800s in Asia. There occurred a 
series of conflicts between the two countries, termed the Livian Wars. There are two brief 
accounts of the Fifth Livian War that took place in 1878. 
 
A brief account of the Fifth Livian War by J. Abman, National Historian of North Livia. 
 
On the 19th July 1878, during a national ceremony in North Livia to honor one of their national 
leaders, ceremonies were interrupted by a sneak attack from South Livia. Thus began the Fifth 
Livian wan. Because the North Livians were caught by surprise, they were unprepared at first and 
the South Livians won a few early battles. Then North Livia began to win. But before the North 
Livians could reach a final victory, a neighboring large country intervened to stop further 
bloodshed. Despite their early setbacks, the later sweeping victories of the North Livians showed 
they would have won had the fighting continued. As a result of this war, South Livians finally 
recognized anything they gained from North Livians would have to be worked out through 
peaceful negotiations. So ended the Livian Wars. 
 
A brief account of the Fifth Livian War by N. Ivan, National Historian of South Livia 
 
In the last war, North Livia had beaten South Livia, taken some of its land, and refused to leave. 
South Livia could no longer accept this situation and spent much money to strengthen its 
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military. On 20th July 1878, the Fifth Livian war began. The war took place with rapid, dramatic 
victories for South Livia, resulting in great celebration. After these dramatic victories, the South 
Livians suffered some minor losses. But then a neighboring large country intervened to stop 
further bloodshed. Despite their later setbacks, South Livia’s victory seemed assured because of 
its position of strength. As a result of this war, South Livians felt a new self-respect. They had 
felt embarrassed by their previous defeats, but now they had proven they were the equals of the 
North Livians. Because South Livians had achieved military respect, they were willing to work 
out differences through peaceful negotiations, thus ending the Livian Wars. 
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Table 2. The Frogs problem. 
 
Across North America frogs are being found that have major physical deformities. Some frogs 
have deformed eyes. Others have misshapen or multiple legs -- or they are missing their legs 
altogether! The following are two brief accounts of why the frogs are being deformed.  
 
A brief account of why the frogs are being deformed 
By G. Agmon 
Scientist investigating the frogs 
 
North American frogs have been found with deformed legs. The deformed frogs have cysts in the 
area from which their legs develop. These cysts are caused by parasites. The parasites enter the 
tadpole early in its development and burrow into the area from which their legs develop. As the 
tadpole develops into an adult frog, the cysts caused by the parasites interfere with normal 
development, and the frog develops with leg deformities such as multiple legs or no legs.  
In order to test whether the parasites cause the deformities in the frogs, small plastic beads were 
surgically implanted into tadpoles in the location where cysts were observed in adult frogs – in 
the area of the body from which legs develop. Many of the frogs that developed from these 
tadpoles had multiple legs and feet coming out of the area in which the plastic bead was 
implanted. Parasites in the water are causing these deformities in the frogs. 
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A brief account of why the frogs are being deformed 
by M. Moyal 
Scientist investigating the frogs 
 
In recent years, North American frogs have been found with deformed legs and eyes. Chemicals 
in the water are causing deformities in the North American frogs. The chemicals in the water 
come in contact with the tadpoles while they are developing, and this contact causes a reaction 
that interferes with normal development. As a result, the adult frogs that develop from these 
tadpoles have deformed body parts.  
In order to test whether the suspected chemical was in the water, a sample of water from the area 
where the frogs live was taken. The water was treated with a substance that is known to cause a 
reaction with the suspected chemical, and the expected reaction did indeed occur. In order to test 
whether this chemical can cause the observed deformities, the chemical was applied to normal 
tadpoles, and the frogs that developed had deformities similar to those observed in the North 
American frogs. 
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Table 3. Levels of epistemological understanding on the Livia and Frog problem 
 
Level                                                                                                               Livia Problem                                               
Frog Problem 
Absolutist 
Certainty empirically possible via direct observation or by appealing      
to authority.                                                                                                    
Certainty only theoretically possible, due to practical limitations.              
Certainty not possible due to absence of observers, but theoretically 
 would be if an observer had been present 
 
Multiplist 
Certainty not possible due to the subjectivity associated 
with human phenomena 
 
Evaluativist 
Certainty not possible but approachable through 
investigation and interpretation of evidence 
 
what happens. 
Pursue more research  
You can’t know what happened. Each 
historian has his own view. 
analyse the water to examine whether 
it contains parasites.   
If he were in the war he would 
know. 
